The nonmonotonic logics definable by definability-preserving choice functions that satisfy Coherence have been studied in [7] . Larger families correspond to weakenings of this property. The cumulative and loop-cumulative relations of [6] are characterized by such models and, as a consequence, one may study the natural connectives for those logics. The representation results obtained are surprisingly smooth: in the completeness part the choice function may be defined on any set of models, not only definable sets and no definability-preservation property is required in the soundness part. For those logics, proper conjunction and negation may be defined, but no proper disjunction, contrary to the situation studied in [7] . Quantum Logics, as defined by [3] are such Logics but the orthogonal complement does not provide a proper negation.
Introduction
In [1] , Birkhoff and von Neumann suggested that the logic of quantum mechanics be isomorphic to the algebra of closed subspaces of Hilbert spaces, under "set product" (i.e., intersection), "closed linear sum", and "orthogonal complement". Many researchers studied the properties of those operations and their results are reviewed in [2] . Recently, Engesser and Gabbay [3] proposed a very different and deeper connection between Logics and Quantum mechanics. For them every quantum state defines a consequence relation. They showed that those consequence relations are nonmonotonic and enjoy some of the most important properties studied in [6] , in particular cumulativity. Whereas Engesser and Gabbay assume a language closed under the propositional connectives (as did Birkhoff and von Neumann), even though those connectives are not at all classical, the purpose of this paper is to study and try to characterize the consequence operations presented by Quantum mechanics before any connectives are defined, in the style of the author's [7] . Since Quantum Logics fail, in general, to satisfy two of the properties assumed there, representation results for larger families than those of [7] are needed. Such results will be developed first. For the conservative extension results to be proven below, models closer to the cumulative models of [6] or of [8] could have been used. The models presented here and their tight link with the failure of Coherence have been preferred both for their intrinsic interest and for compatibility with [7] .
Reflections on this paper
The study of C-logics is unexpectedly smooth and attractive. The basic intuition behind the cumulative relations of KLM is confirmed: cumulative relations yield classical connectives but the disjunction (that may be defined as usual from negation and conjunction) does not behave proof-theoretically as a proper disjunction should. The section on L-logics is less interesting. I am not sure where it leads. The results are straightforward translation from KLM and L-logics do not seem to behave in any better way with respect to connectives than C-logics. The reason it may be interesting is that Quantum Logics are not only C-logics but also L-logics. But two main questions are left open: can all L-logics be presented as Quantum Logics or do Quantum Logics satisfy additional properties? What is the meaning for Quantum Logics of the classical negation and conjunction that can be defined for any C-logics?
Why do Birkhoff and von Neumann expect that the negation of an observable be observable?
C-logics 2.1 Definition
The framework is the one presented in [7] . Let L be any non-empty set. The elements of L should be viewed as propositions or formulas and L is therefore a language. At present no structure is assumed on L and its elements are therefore to be taken as atomic propositions. Let C : 2 L −→ 2 L .
Definition 1
The operation C is said to be a C-logics iff it satisfies the two following properties.
Properties
and
Proof: Let us prove, first, that a C-logics satisfies Idempotence. By Inclusion A ⊆ C(A) ⊆ C(A), therefore, by Cumulativity: C(A) = C(C(A)). Assume, now that C satisfies Inclusion, Idempotence and Cautious Monotonicity. Let A ⊆ B ⊆ C(A). By Cautious Monotonicity, we have C(A) ⊆ C(B). Therefore, we have B ⊆ C(A) ⊆ C(B). By Cautious Monotonicity again, we have:
. By Idempotence, then, we conclude C(B) ⊆ C(A) and therefore C(B) = C(A).
Lemma 2 (Makinson) An operation C is a C-logics iff it satisfies Inclusion and
Proof: Assume C is a C-logics and A ⊆ C(B). By Inclusion, we have B ⊆ A ∪ B ⊆ C(B) and by Cumulativity:
Assume now that C satisfies Inclusion and 2-Loop, and that A ⊆ B ⊆ C(A). By Inclusion: A ⊆ B ⊆ C(B). By 2-Loop, then, we have: C(A) = C(B). The finer study of C-logics relies, as for monotonic logics, on the notions of a consistent set and of a theory.
The following follows from Idempotence.
Lemma 4 If A ⊆ B and A is inconsistent, so is B.
Proof: If C(A) = L, we have A ⊆ B ⊆ C(A) and, by Cumulativity,
Definition 3 A set A ⊆ L is said to be maximal consistent iff it is consistent and any strict superset B ⊃ A is inconsistent.
The following is obvious (by Inclusion).
Lemma 5
There is only one inconsistent theory, namely L.
Lemma 6 Any maximal consistent set A is a theory.
Proof: By Inclusion A ⊆ C(A). By Lemma 3 the set C(A) is consistent and by maximality: A = C(A).
Notation:Let us define Cn : 2 L −→ 2 L by:
The following follows from Lemma 5.
Lemma 7
Cn(A) = T ⊇A, T a consistent theory T.
Lemma 8 A ⊆ Cn(A) ⊆ C(A).
Proof: By the definition of Cn and the fact that C(A) is a theory that includes A (Idempotence and Inclusion). Lemma 4 , there is no consistent theory that includes A and, by Lemma 7, Cn(A) = L.
Proof: By Lemma 8, we have C(A) ⊆ Cn(C(A)) ⊆ C(C(A)). By Idempotence, then, the first equality is proved. By Lemma 8 and Cumulativity, we have C(A) = C(Cn(A)).
Corollary 1 For any theory
T , Cn(T ) = T . Proof: Cn(T ) = Cn(C(T )) = C(T ) = T .
Lemma 11
The operation Cn is monotonic, i.e., if A ⊆ B, then Cn(A) ⊆ Cn(B) and also idempotent, i.e., Cn(Cn(A)) = Cn(A).
Proof: Monotonicity follows immediately from the definition of Cn. For Idempotence, notice that, by Monotonicity and Corollary 1, any theory T that includes A also includes Cn(A): Cn(A) ⊆ Cn(T ) = T .
fC-models
Assume M is a set (of models), about which no assumption is made, and |= ⊆ M × L is a (satisfaction) binary relation (nothing assumed either). For any set A ⊆ L, we shall denote by A or by Mod(A) the set of all models that satisfy all elements of A:
For typographical reasons we shall use both notations, sometimes even in the same formula. For any set of models X ⊆ M, we shall denote by X the set of all formulas that are satisfied in all elements of X:
The following are easily proven, for any A, B ⊆ L, X, Y ⊆ M: they amount to the fact that the operations X → X and A → A form a Galois connection.
The last technical notion that will be needed is that of a definable set of models. It will be used in the completeness proof below, but not in Definition 6.
Definition 5 A set X of models is said to be definable iff one of the two following equivalent conditions holds:
The set of all definable subsets of X will be denoted by D X .
The proof of the equivalence of the two propositions above is obvious. Note that f is defined on arbitrary sets of models, not only on definable sets as in [7] . In the same vein, we do not require here that the image by f of a definable set be definable as was necessary in the corresponding soundness result of [7] .
Definition 8 An fC-model is said to be a restricted fC-model iff its choice function f also satisfies, for any set X:
Consistency f (X) = ∅ ⇒ X = ∅.
Properties of fC-models
This section makes clear the relation between fC-models and the models of [7] . It will not be used in the sequel. There one considered choice functions satisfying Contraction,
Lemma 13 Any function f that satisfies Inclusion, Coherence and Local
Monotonicity satisfies Local Cumulativity.
Soundness
Theorem 1 Let M, |=, f be an fC-model and the operation C be such that:
Then C is a C-logics.
Representation Theorem 2 If C is a C-logics, then there is a restricted fC-model
Notice that, comparing to Theorem 1 we are getting Consistency for free. Proof: For M take all consistent theories of C. Set T |= a iff a ∈ T . It follows that, by Lemma 7, for any A ⊆ L,
We must now define a choice function f . We shall do that in two stages. First, we shall define f on definable sets of models, then on arbitrary sets. Suppose that X is a definable subset of M and that X = A = B. Then, Cn(A) = Cn(B) and, by Lemma 10, C(A) = C(B). The following definition of f , for any definable set of models, is therefore well-formed:
It is worth noticing that for any A, f ( A) is a definable set. This is not in fact required by Theorem 1. More stringent properties of f on definable sets only, such as Coherence or the requirement that the image by f be a singleton, may be obtained but at the cost of definability-preservation. We easily see that:
, by Lemma 10. Notice that, in the above, we use f only on definable sets. We shall now show that f satisfies Contraction, Local Cumulativity and Consistency, when all sets considered are definable. We shall leave for the end the definition of a proper extension of f to arbitrary sets of models. Let X = A be a definable subset of M.
as shown in Section 2.3. We have proved Contraction. Let X = A and Y = B be definable subsets of L and assume: f (X) ⊆ Y ⊆ X. We have: Cn(A) ⊆ Cn(B) ⊆ C(A). By Lemma 10 and Cumulativity, we have: C(Cn(A)) = C(Cn(B)) and, by Lemma 10,
By Lemma 10, then, A is inconsistent. By Lemma 4 there is no consistent theory that includes A and therefore A = X = ∅.
We have proved Consistency. We must now extend f to arbitrary subsets of M in a way that enforces Contraction, Local Cumulativity and Consistency. Given an arbitrary subset X ⊆ M, we shall define f ′ (X) by considering two cases.
•
• Secondly, if there is no such definable Y we shall put f ′ (X) = X.
We must first check that the first case above is a proper definition. Suppose indeed that f (Y ) ⊆ X ⊆ Y and f (Z) ⊆ X ⊆ Z for definable sets Y and Z. Then, by Lemma 12, the set Y ∩ Z is definable and
Let us show, now, that f ′ (X) ⊆ X. In the first case:
′ (X) = ∅ and Z = ∅ and therefore X = ∅. In the second case f ′ (X) = X = ∅.
Connectives in C-logics 2.7.1 Conjunction and Negation
We shall show that C-logics admit a classical conjunction and a classical negation. Let us assume now, for the remainder of this section, that the language L is closed under a binary connective written ∧ and a unary connective written ¬. • m |= ¬a iff m |= a, then the inference operation defined by the fC-model satisfies:
Proof: The first property follows from the fact that Mod(A ∪ {a ∧ b}) = Mod(A ∪ {a} ∪ {b}). For the second property notice that Mod(A ∪ {a} ∪ {¬a}) = ∅ implies, by Contraction, that f (Mod(A ∪ {a} ∪ {¬a})) = ∅. For the third property, since no element of M satisfies both a and ¬a, if C(A, ¬a) = L, there is no m that satisfies C(A, ¬a) and f (Mod(A ∪ ¬a)) = ∅. Since the model is a restricted fC-model, Mod(A ∪ ¬a) = ∅. Therefore every m that satisfies A also satisfies a and a ∈ C(A).
The reader should notice that it is claimed that, if C(A, ¬a) = L, then any m satisfying A also satisfies a, but it is not claimed that, under this hypothesis, a ∈ Cn(A). Indeed Cn is defined via the theories of C and the relation of those to the elements of M is not straightforward. The reader should also note that a similar result (Equation 8.5) was obtained in [7] only assuming Coherence. Here Coherence is not required, Consistency is required in its place. The following theorem shows the converse. It requires a compactness assumption. We shall, then, assume that C satisfies the following: Proof: By ¬ − R2, A ∪ {¬a} is consistent. By Weak Compactness (and Zorn's lemma), there is a maximal consistent set B that contains it. This B does not contain a by ¬ − R1.
Lemma 15 Assume C satisfies Inclusion, Cumulativity, ∧-R, ¬-R1 and ¬-R2. If A is a maximal consistent set, then
• ¬a ∈ A iff a ∈ A.
Proof: By ∧-R, a ∧ b ∈ C(A) iff a ∈ C(A) and b ∈ C(A), but, by Lemma 6, A is a theory. If ¬a ∈ A, then a ∈ A since A is consistent, by ¬-R1. If ¬a ∈ A, then by the maximality of A, C(A, ¬a = L and, by ¬-R2, a ∈ C(A), but A is a theory.
Lemma 16 Assume C satisfies Weak Compactness, ¬ − R1 and ¬ − R2. Then
Proof: The left-hand side is a subset of the right-hand side by Lemmas 7 and 16. But if a ∈ Cn(A), then a ∈ C(A) and, by Lemma 14, there is a maximal consistent B that includes C(A) but does not contain a.
Let us now proceed to the proof of Theorem 4.
Proof:
We modify the construction of Theorem 2, by considering not all consistent theories but only maximal consistent sets. Those maximal consistent sets are theories and behave classically for ∧ and ¬ by Lemma 15. By Lemma 16, for any A ⊆ L, A = Cn(A).
The remainder of the proof is unchanged.
We may now show that propositional nonmonotonic logic is not weaker than (and therefore exactly the same as) monotonic logic. In the following theorem, we consider a propositional language in which negation and conjunction are considered basic and other connectives are defined in the usual classical way.
Theorem 5 Let L be a propositional calculus (negation and conjunction basic, other connectives defined classically) and a, b ∈ L.
The following propositions are equivalent. The only non-trivial part of the proof is that 1 implies 5. Assume a |= b and C satisfies Inclusion, Cumulativity, Weak Compactness and the rules ∧-R, ¬-R1 and ¬-R2. By Theorem 4, there is a set M, a satisfaction relation |= that behaves classically with respect to ∧ and ¬ and a definabilitypreserving choice function satisfying Contraction and Local Cumulativity such that C(a, ¬b) = f ( {a} ∩ {¬b}). But, by assumption {a} ∩ {¬b} = ∅. By Contraction, then C(a, ¬b) = ∅ = L. Theorem 5 shows that the proof theory of the semantically-classical conjunction and negation in a nonmonotonic setting is the same as in a monotonic setting. The following shows, that, in yet another sense, C-logics admit a proper conjunction and a proper negation: one may conservatively extend any C-logics on a set of atomic propositions to a language closed under conjunction and negation. It is customary to consider Introduction-Elimination rules, such as ∧-R, ¬-R1 and ¬-R2 as definitions of the connectives. Hacking [5, Section VII] discusses this idea and proposes that, to be considered as bona fide definitions of the connectives, the rules must be such that they ensure that any legal logic on a small language may be conservatively extended to a legal logic on the language extended by closure under the connective.
a logically implies b, i.e., a |= b,

for any operation C that satisfies Inclusion, Idempotence, Monotonicity, Weak Compactness and the rules ∧-R, ¬-R1 and ¬-R2 above: b ∈ C(a),
for any operation C that satisfies
Theorem 6 Let P be an arbitrary set of atomic propositions and C a Clogics over P . Let L be the closure of P under ∧ and ¬. Then, there exists a C-logics C' on L that satisfies ∧-R, ¬-R1 and ¬-R2, such that, for any
Proof: By Theorem 2, there is a restricted fC-model on P M, |=, f such that C(A) = f ( A). Let us now extend |= to L by m |= a ∧ b iff m |= a and m |= b and m |= ¬a iff m |= a. We claim that M, |=, f is now a restricted fC-model on L, whose satisfaction relation |= behaves classically for ¬ and ∧. Indeed, the properties required from f do not involve the satisfaction relation at all, they deal with subsets of M exclusively. Let us define, for any A ⊆ L, C ′ (A) = f ( A). By Theorem 1, C' is a C-logics. By Theorem 3 it satisfies ∧-R, ¬-R1 and ¬-R2. It is left to us to see that C(A) = P ∩ C ′ (A), for any A ⊆ P . This follows straightforwardly from the fact that both C(A) and C ′ (A) are the sets of formulas (the former of P , the latter of L) satisfied by all members of the set f ( A).
Disjunction
We have seen that any C-logics admits classical negation and conjunction. The reader may think that this implies that it also admits a classical disjunction defined as a ∨ b = ¬(¬a ∧ ¬b). Indeed it is the case that, if we define disjunction in this way one of the basic properties of disjunction is satisfied:
But the other fundamental property of disjunction does not hold.
The following example shows that, in general, no proper disjunction can be defined in C-logics. This example above has to be opposed to the results of [7] that show that if f satisfies Coherence, there is a satisfactory disjunction.
Connection with previous work
Theorem 7 Let L be a propositional calculus and C an operation that satisfies Weak-Compactness, Inclusion, Cumulativity, ∧-R, ¬-R1 and ¬-R2. Define a binary relation among propositions by: a ∼b iff b ∈ C(a). Then, the relation ∼ is a cumulative relation in the sense of [6] .
Proof: We shall show that ∼ satisfies Left Logical Equivalence, Right Weakening, Reflexivity, Cut and Cautious Monotonicity. For Left-LogicalEquivalence, suppose |= a ↔ a ′ . By Theorem 5, a ′ ∈ C(a) and, by Cumulativity, C(a) = C(a, a ′ ). But, similarly, exchanging a and a C(a, b) and a ∼ b ′ . Reflexivity follows from Inclusion. Cut and Cautious Monotonicity together are equivalent to: if a ∼ b, then a ∧ b ∼ c iff a ∼ c. Assume b ∈ C(a), then, by Cumulativity, C(a) = C(a, b).
The converse also holds. Proof: The operation C may be defined in a way first proposed in the Theorem 14 of [4] : b ∈ C(A) iff there exists some formula a such that A |= a (|= is logical implication of propositional calculus) enjoying the following property: for any a ′ such that A |= a ′ and a ′ |= a, one has a ′ ∼b. For Weak Compactness, assume C(A) = L. Then false ∈ C(A) and there is some a such that A |= a and a ∼ false. There is a finite subset B of A such that B |= a. Let b be the conjunction of all the propositions of B. We have b |= a and therefore b ∼ a. But a ∼ false implies a ∼ b. Therefore b ∼ false and C(B) = C(b) = L. The other properties claimed are not difficult to show.
L-logics
A sub-family of C-logics will be defined now. It corresponds to the cumulative with loop (CL) relations of [6] .
Definition 9
The operation C is said to be an L-logics iff it satisfies the two following properties.
The assumption of Loop is:
The conclusion could equivalently have been: C(A i ) = C(A j ) for any i, j = 0, . . . , n − 1. Notice that for n = 2, the condition Loop is the condition 2-Loop of Lemma 2. Therefore any L-logics is a C-logics. The characteristic property of L-logics is embedded in the relation to be defined now.
Definition 10 Let T and S be theories. Let us define T ≤ S iff there exists a set
The following holds without any assumption on C.
Lemma 17
The relation ≤ is reflexive. If T, S are two theories such that T ⊆ S, then T ≤ S.
Proof: S ⊆ S and C(S) = S imply S ≤ S. T ⊆ S and C(T ) = T imply T ≤ S. The next lemma holds only for L-logics. Notice that, even for L-logics, the relation ≤ is not transitive in general.
Lemma 18 If C is an L-logics, and T
In particular, the relation ≤ is antisymmetric for L-logics (in fact for Clogics).
Definition 11 Let T and S be theories. Let us define T < S iff T ≤ S and S ≤ T , or equivalently (for C-logics) T ≤ S and T = S. Let < + be the transitive closure of <.
Lemma 19 If C is an L-logics, then the relation <
+ is irreflexive and therefore a strict partial order.
Proof: By Lemma 18.
Quantum Consequence Operations
Birkhoff and von Neumann [1] framed Quantum Logics in Hilbert style, i.e., as a set of valid propositions in propositional calculus. Engesser and Gabbay [3] proposed to view Quantum Logics in a different light: as a consequence relation describing what can be deduced from what. They assume a language closed under the propositional connectives, but their definition makes perfect sense and is very rich even on a language that contains only atomic propositions. This is, in this paper's view, a major step taken by Engesser and Gabbay since Birkhoff and von Neumann's framework does not allow any interesting consideration in the absence of connectives. The setting proposed by Engesser and Gabbay allows us to discuss first the nature of Quantum Deduction without any need to posit connectives, and then to consider the proof-theoretic and semantics properties of connectives one at a time.
Assume a Hilbert space H and an element h ∈ H are given. Assume also a non-empty set (language) L of closed subspaces of H is given. The elements of L, the atomic propositions are, thus, closed subspaces of H. For every proposition a ∈ L, we shall denote by a p the projection on the subspace a: for every x ∈ H, a p (x) is the element of a closest to x. For every set of propositions: A ⊆ L, A * def = a∈A a and A * p will denote the projection on A * , i.e., on the intersection of all the elements of A.
Definition 12 (Engesser-Gabbay) Let C : 2 L −→ 2 L be defined by:
Theorem 9 The operation C defined above is an L-logics.
Engesser and Gabbay essentially noticed already that C is a C-logics. We need a lemma.
Let us now prove Theorem 9 Proof: Indeed, A * p h ∈ A * and therefore, for any a ∈ A, A p h ∈ a, and we have shown Inclusion.
Assume A ⊆ B ⊆ C(A). By Lemma 20, we have A *
and we have shown Cumulativity.
Open Question
Do the four properties above characterize those consequence operations presentable by Hilbert spaces? Or are there other properties shared by those operations presentable by Hilbert spaces that do not follow from the above?
Connectives
Conjunction
Conjunction is unproblematic. Even infinite conjunctions are easily defined. If A is a set of propositions, and each a ∈ A is associated with some closed subspace a * , we may associate the proposition a∈A a with the closed subspace a∈A a * , i.e., A * and the rule ∧-R is validated: C(A, B) = C( a, B).
Negation
The situation for negation is most intriguing. By Theorem 9 any operation C presented as a Quantum Logic is an L-logics, therefore a C-logics. Theorem 6 shows that C-logics admit a negation satisfying ¬-R1 and ¬-R2. We therefore expect Quantum Logics to admit such a negation. But the treatment of negation proposed by Birkhoff and von Neumann and later used by Engesser and Gabbay does not do the job in the following sense. Suppose we define (¬a) * = (a * ) ⊥ where ⊥ denotes the orthogonal complement. It is easy to see that ¬-R1 is satisfied since the intersection of a subspace and its orthogonal complement is {0}, but ¬-R2 is not satisfied. Consider for example three generic (not parallel and not orthogonal) one-dimensional subspaces (lines through the origin) a, b and c in the real plane. Let h be any non-zero vector of c. The intersection of a and b ⊥ is {0} and therefore C(a, ¬b) = L. But b ∈ C(a) since the projection of h on a is not in b. This failure of ¬-R2, which is the principle of proof by contradiction, was in fact already noted or guessed by Birkhoff and von Neumann. In section 17, p. 837, they compare Quantum Logics with other non-classical logics introduced on introspective or philosophical grounds, such as intuistionistic logics. They note that even though "logicians have usually assumed that properties of negation were the ones least able to withstand a critical analysis, the study of (quantum) mechanics points to the distributive identities as the weakest link in the algebra of logic." And they conclude: "our conclusion agrees perhaps more with those critiques of logic, which find most objectionable the assumption that to deduce an absurdity from the conjunction of a and not b, justifies one in inferring that a implies b". This paper's conclusions agree only in part, and will be presented below.
Disjunction
A proper disjunction should satisfy ∨-R1 and ∨−R2 defined in Section 2.7.2. We have seen that C-logics do not always support such a disjunction. It is left to be seen whether Quantum Logics support such a disjunction. In any C-logics that satisfies ∧-R, ∨-R1 and ∨-R2, the distributive equality holds, in the sense that C(A, a ∧ (b ∨ c)) = C (A, (a ∧ b) ∨ (a ∧ c) ). The only Quantum Logics that admit a proper disjunction are therefore those Quantum Logics that support the distributive law. This is a very limited family.
Conclusions and future work
Quantum Logics are nonmonotonic logics as noticed by Engesser and Gabbay, they are also very respectable nonmonotonic logics since they are L-logics. It is indeed surprising that Quantum Logics come to satisfy formal properties designed with a completely different intention: to describe properties "introduced on introspective grounds" and intended to describe disciplined "jumping to conclusions". Intersection of closed subspaces provides a perfect semantics for conjunction. Orthogonal complement does not provide a suitable semantics for negation, but there is probably a respectable negation. It seems doubtful that one could find a suitable corresponding operation among closed subspaces of Hilbert spaces that would enable us to associate a closed subspace to the negation of a closed subspace. This probably means that one cannot assume that the negation of an observable is an observable. But must we insist that the negation of an observable be observable? Couldn't negation mean something about what we know and not about the world? Disjunction is probably incompatible with Quantum Logics altogether.
